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3 
Introduction 
The chemical weapon norm has been repeatedly violated by the parties to the Syrian Civil 
War. The violation of such an internationally sacrosanct norm would appear to provide a 
clear impetus for collective action to hold perpetrators to account. Yet, the diplomatic 
discourse on this matter has increasingly been characterized as particularistic and impotent. 
In August 2017, Carla Del Ponte, the co-commissioner of the United Nations (UN) 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (IICISAR), 
quit her role in protest; citing the absence of political will, and the futile position that the 
Commission found itself in relation to war crime prosecution more broadly (Wintour, 2017). 
In this article, we examine this apparent deadlock, but also consider what progress has been 
made on the issue of chemical weapon justice specifically in the Syrian case. Progress 
includes work done through the comparatively well-developed set of international 
mechanisms in place to deal with chemical weapon war crimes. It also includes systems 
developed specifically in response to chemical weapon use in Syria as well as war crimes 
more generally.  
 It is clear that the apparent deadlock on the issue of chemical weapon justice centers 
at one level on a situation in which the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) have committed to differing accounts of who is behind chemical weapon 
use in Syria. Whether this reflects a genuinely held consensus on the issue within intelligence 
communities and in the higher echelons of governments is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
It is also clear that selective outrage has been the norm, in the context of a broader bloody 
and vicious civil war. However, there is a need to take into account more than cynical 
patronage alone to understand the politics surrounding this issue. Quests for justice have 
undoubtedly been made subservient to other state interests during the conflict (Bentley, 2014; 
Mearsheimer, 2014). However, disagreements about chemical weapon issues cannot be 
simply “explained away” as simply a  means by which states have justified pursuit of more 
immediate interests to domestic and international audiences. Likewise, it is also clear that 
international disagreements on Syria are embedded in deeper struggles related to the 
architecture of the international system (Bellamy, 2017). It would also be reductive to 
understand developments in Syrian chemical weapon justice as simply a “playing out” of 
these broader struggles. For this reason, we place practices and discourses of international 
criminal justice at the center of our analysis; contextualizing them in this broader political 
environment. In this sense, we follow the constructivists in arguing that discourses and 
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established practices of criminal justice have contributed to interpretation of events and 
political decision making (See e.g., Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 261; Wendt, 1992, pp. 396–
397). Indeed, it is clear that criminal justice matters in international politics, (Armstrong, 
Farrell, & Lambert, 2012; Holsti, 1991; Koh, 1997; Penrose, 2000; Slaughter, Tulumello, & 
Wood, 1998) even though there is endless disagreement on the questions on how and why it 
matters and the best routes to achieving it. This is in the sense that conceptions, practices, and 
institutions of international criminal justice have informed decision making in both national 
and international forums. In taking this approach, we adopt an open framing of the concept of 
justice, and highlight areas of agreement, disagreement as well as practical initiatives 
particularly in areas such as war crime documentation, multilateral attribution processes, and 
prosecution.  
 This paper is not designed as an argument for or against a specific position adopted by 
different actors on this matter. Nor do we seek point to inconsistencies and tensions within 
the positions we describe. Instead, our article seeks to sketch those positions adopted publicly 
by states, and the dynamics which have emerged between those positions. Our analysis also 
makes contributions to ongoing discussions in relation to the future of Syrian justice, and 
provides insights into the purpose and prospects of chemical weapon evidence gathering and 
attribution processes.  
Our study is presented as a historical case-study and as such points to key contingencies, 
moments, path-dependencies and re-current patterns of behavior. The paper is structured in 
two parts. The next section discusses central axioms of this article. Specifically the claims 
that: 
a) There have been substantive, and not just superficial disagreements between states on 
the issue of justice, primarily along legalist and pragmatist lines; 
b) That international criminal justice initiatives are tightly intertwined with other drives 
and interests of states; 
c) That there has been a partial stalling of the international criminal justice agenda in 
relation to chemical weapons. However progress toward ensuring some form of 
accountability on the issue has still been made through a number of distinct formal 
international mechanisms and through civil society evidence collection, curation, and 
archive systems.  
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This is followed, in the second part of the article, by an analysis of key periods of chemical 
weapon justice politics. This section serves to contextualize various initiatives directed at 
evidence gathering, attribution and criminal prosecution. This enables us to further flesh out 
the implications of our argument in empirical terms. The conclusion of the article reflects on 
the implications for thinking about more recent developments, including international 
responses to the Khan Shaykhun attack of April 2017.  
Conceptualizing international chemical weapon criminal justice 
In this section we discuss the central axioms of our paper. This then allows us to conceptually 
unpack what we mean when we refer to international chemical weapon justice, in terms of the 
broader landscape of this issue area, and the type of practical initiatives it includes.  
Substantive disagreements on international criminal justice 
It is clear that there have been substantive disagreements about the issue of international 
criminal justice. They have been most apparent in discussions over the prosecution of the 
Syrian president Assad as a sitting head of state. On the surface level, the debate on Syrian 
justice maps along pre-existing fault lines concerning transitional justice. On the one hand, 
there have been advocates who have adopted a more legalist position. They emphasize that 
“there is no peace and no reconciliation without punitive justice” (Clark 2007, 765–66; Parent 
2010, 283; Vinjamuri & Snyder 2004, p. 351). Indeed, Del Ponte’s resignation (referred to at 
the outset of paper) reflects a legalist exasperation. She stated publicly that “[j]ustice must do 
its work because without justice because there is no real peace we know that from history” 
(as cited in Wintour, 2017). On the other hand, pragmatists have tended to argue that“justice, 
in its prosecutorial acceptation, could be more pursuable in a later stage of the transitional 
process, when institutions are stronger” (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2004, p. 346). In the Syrian 
case, the permanent members of the UNSC also appear to be split along these lines. Western 
actors have argued that the removal of Assad is crucial for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict (Dixon, 2017). Non-Western actors (including Russia and China) have argued that 
the Syrian president should be at the centre of diplomatic negotiations for an effective truce 
among the warring parties (Snetkov & Lanteigne, 2015). Justice is, in the short-term, a 
secondary concern. 
In this article, we acknowledge the fact that the concepts of pragmatism and legalism as 
well as the relationship between them escapes simple characterization, reflecting only 
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idealized archetypal policy positions (Keller, 2008, pp. 14–15; Leebaw, 2008, p. 95; Sharp, 
2015, p. 151). It is also clear that foreign policy decisions are the product of a wide range of 
tactical and more strategic considerations; and are taken in an evolving domestic and 
international context. This means that such positions are always to some extent contingent 
and subject to development over time. In addition, states may to some extent take a range of 
positions, and emphasize different priorities in different forums. While we acknowledge that 
the role of justice discourses in this area can certainly not be understood exclusively with 
reference to these idealized and juxtaposed positions, it is still a useful departure point for 
understanding how states have engaged with, interpreted and responded to, initiatives in this 
area.  This is in two senses. First it is clear, this dichotomy has been a prominent feature in 
public diplomacy, which has shaped public understanding and expectations on this issue. 
There is certainly likely to be more nuanced positions on the issue of justice (and its trade-off 
with other issues) in the decision making and bargaining which occurs “behind closed doors” 
within and between states. As an exploratory study however, occurring at a time in which 
debates are still ongoing, with much occurring away from the public eye, such a framing is 
still useful, in terms of pointing to future lines of enquiry and prospects for practical progress.  
Justice as a competing interest 
While we argue that justice debates have mattered, disagreements on the criminal justice have 
also been tightly bound with developments in other issue domains. Of particular importance 
have been the evolving dynamics of the internationalized civil war, the Syrian disarmament 
process, and conflict resolution processes. 
In relation to the broader civil war, early Western military support of regime change 
has evaporated over time due to a number of factors. The first, was the rapid progress made 
by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2013-2014. In response, the focus of Western 
engagement in this conflict shifted to addressing this threat. In addition, the escalation of 
Russian military involvement in the conflict in September 2015 has involved a large scale air 
campaign in coordination with the Syrian Government and its regional allies against a wide 
range, and ever evolving, collection of armed opposition groups. As a recent U.S. 
Congressional Services Report notes, this has led to a situation in which “Senior members of 
the Trump Administration have spoken critically of the Syrian president’s leadership but call 
for de-escalation of the underlying conflict and a negotiated settlement, rather than seeking to 
compel Syrian president Assad’s departure from power” (Humud, Blanchard, & Nikitin, 
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2017, p. 2) These shifting military realities on the ground, and shifting diplomatic positions 
have of course likely had impacts on the politics of international justice. There is consensus 
in the UNSC on the need for Syrian chemical disarmament. However the relationship 
between this process and broader conflict resolution and transitional justice processes are 
contested. In addition, Western powers have tended emphasize their role as coercive powers, 
where as Russia and Syria have been able to present themselves as partaking in a more 
consensual process of disarmament (Makdisi & Pison Hindawi, 2017). Despite these 
tensions, substantial progress has been made, which has seen Syria destroy all its declared 
stocks including some 1300 metric tonnes of warfare agent and precursor, and the 
decommissioning of some 27 facilities. This is something which Russia and Syria have 
continually argued demonstrates Syria’s willingness to work openly with the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the OPCW Director-General and 
other states have expressed concern about the completeness and accuracy of the Syria’s 
declaration (Humud, Blanchard, & Nikitin 2017, p. 37). This dynamic has continued to be 
reflected in ongoing multilateral and unilateral actions in response to allegations of Syrian 
non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which are further unpacked 
in the next section.  
Finally, ongoing peace processes have been of direct relevance to the issue of 
international chemical weapon justice (see Lundgren, 2016). Is has already been argued that 
the Syrian Government’s central role in the disarmament process strengthened its military 
position in 2013 (Bentley 2014).  On the one hand it is clear that chemical weapons served a 
symbolic role in broader discussions about the future of the Syrian conflict with the 
disarmament deal framed initially as a potential point from which to build broader agreement. 
At the same time however, it is also clear that Western escalation in response to regime use of 
chemical weapons can also be framed as a spoiler for broader peace processes. In the 
empirical section below, we flesh out the implications of each of these domains for justice in 
practical and conceptual terms.  
A partial stalling of the justice agenda(s) 
The final aspect of our argument is that this situation has resulted in a partial stalling of the 
justice agenda during the period studied. We reveal this through tracing the development of a 
range of initiatives in a number of forums directed at confirming and attributing chemical 
weapon use as well as prosecuting those responsible for use. While an internationally led 
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prosecution of the Syrian government for chemical weapon use is currently a political 
impossibility, a substantial body of evidence has been built against both state and non-state 
actors–and a wide range of avenues for action are being explored and pursued. In the analysis 
below we sign-post key developments in a number of forums. In particular we focus on 
developments in the UNSC, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), and General Assembly. These are placed in the context of unilateral and national 
level measures, as well as civil society initiatives.  
Progress and obstacles toward justice 
 
Early allegations of chemical weapon use  
 
Concern about the humanitarian and security situation in Syria became significant as the civil 
war escalated in the spring of 2011. There was division in the UNSC over the best response 
to the situation, with the United States and several allies favoring a managed regime change 
and Russia preferring to keep the current regime in place, in part due to fears of state collapse 
(Allison, 2013). This split was reflected in the failure of three Security Council resolutions in 
October 2011, February 2012, and July 2012. Around this time, allegations of small-scale 
chemical weapon use also began to emerge (Robinson, 2013). There were also conflicted 
reports of an Israeli airstrike against a Syrian chemical weapon installation in January 2013 
(Benari, 2013). 
The Syrian Government was first to officially request the UN Secretary-General to 
establish an investigation into an incident at Khan al-Asal, which had taken place on March, 
19, 2013. In its request, the Syria Government claimed “terrorist groups” had fired a chemical 
filled rocket. The day after this initial request, the UN Secretary-General decided to establish 
the UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (based on General Assembly Resolution 42/37 C and UNSC Resolution 620 
[1988]). This was followed by a flurry of further allegations and counter-allegations against 
the Syrian Government and opposition groups throughout the summer (UN Mission to 
Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2013). 
During this period, U.S., British, and French officials made increasingly explicit threats that 
further chemical weapon use by the Syrian Government would result in increased Western 
intervention in the Syrian conflict; including the possibility of direct military intervention 
(Stahn, 2013). During this period there were also bilateral discussions between the United 
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States and Russia on the prospect of Syrian chemical disarmament. However, while there was 
an emerging public consensus that Syrian disarmament was desirable, it was apparent that 
this issue was deeply intertwined with a fundamental disagreement between the United States 
and Russia on the question of Syrian regime change- and in particular threats by the west to 
further escalate support for rebel groups (Gearing, 2013; Putin, 2013).  
In June 2013, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic found that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that chemical 
agents have been used as weapons” but stated that “the precise agents, delivery systems or 
perpetrators could not be identified” (Human Rights Council, 2013, p. 2). In addition, U.S., 
French, and British officials asserted publicly with varying degrees of confidence that sarin 
had been employed and that it had been used by the Syrian Government (Erlanger, 
Cumming-Bruce, & Cowell 2013). That month, the U.S. Government also publicly 
announced that it was increasing the “scope and scale” of its support for Syrian rebel groups, 
which was justified with reference to the Syrian Government’s alleged use of chemical 
weapons (Spetalnick & Solomon, 2013). 
Inspectors from the UN Secretary General’s mission reached Syria on August, 18, 
2013, and it was during their visit that the larger Sarin attack occurred in Ghouta (August, 
21). In the days following the attack, U.S. president Barack Obama sought to secure 
international and domestic support to launch strikes against the Syrian Government as early 
as the weekend of August, 30-31. He requested support from the United Kingdom (UK) 
prime minister, who failed to secure parliamentary approval. The reasons for the failure of 
this vote were multifaceted (Kaarbo & Kenealy, 2016), but it is clear that the blurring of the 
goals of regime change, punishment and deterrence served to undermine the coherence and 
public legitimacy of the proposal. Following the British vote, Obama decided to seek U.S. 
Congressional approval. He did not recall congress early however, leaving a window of 
opportunity for a multilateral agreement on Syrian chemical disarmament. This disarmament 
process would in turn become a focal point of diplomatic efforts over coming months. It was 
clear at this point however, that calls for justice would not disappear along with Syria’s 
chemical weapon stocks (see, e.g., UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013)).   
Syria’s troubled membership to the CWC 
Syria’s membership to the OPCW has been marred by two concerns. The first is that initial 
declarations and subsequent amendments to these declarations from the Syrian regime have 
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been incomplete. The second have been ongoing allegations of use, including the use of both 
nerve agents and industrial chemicals such as chlorine; which continued throughout the 
remainder of 2013 and early 2014.  
The UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic claimed it had convincing evidence that government forces carried out chlorine 
attacks in April 2014 (Human Rights Council, 2014). These claims came in the context of a 
wide range of allegations that war crimes were being carried out by all sides, which were 
being documented by the aforementioned organizations as well as other bodies such as the 
Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA). In May 2014, a French 
initiative supported by 58 UN member states, which also received widespread civil society 
support (Civil Society Organizations on Need for Justice, 2014), was vetoed by Russia and 
China. The U.S. permanent representative, who supported the motion argued that:  
 [T]he victims of the Assad regimes’ industrial killing machine and the victims of 
 terrorist attacks deserve more than to have more dead counted. They deserve to have 
 each of us, the members of this Security Council, counted and held to account. They 
 deserve to have history record those who stood with them, and those who were 
 willing to raise their hands to deny them a chance at justice. While there may be no 
 [International Criminal Court, ICC] accountability today for the horrific crimes 
 being carried out against the Syrian people, there should be accountability for those 
 members of this Council that have prevented accountability, (Power, 2014) 
In justifying his veto, the Russian permanent representative suggested that the French 
proposal was designed to provoke armed intervention in the Syrian conflict and served to 
divide the permanent members of the UNSC. This was troubling in the context of recent 
successes over Syrian chemical weapon destruction. He also characterized this act as 
demonstrating particularism, considering the absence of investigations into allegations 
against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UK, and the United States in Libya 
and Iraq. Further to this, both Russia and China pointed to the negative impact that ICC 
referral could have on the prospect of reaching a political solution to the Syrian conflict 
(United Nations Press Office, 2014). As was noted in a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2014) press release: 
 There is undoubtedly evidence of massive violations of human rights in Syria. They 
 are the consequence of the many years of armed confrontation, as well as the spread 
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 of international terrorism and multiple formations of foreign mercenaries, sponsored 
 from outside. In these conditions, the task of the international community is to 
 achieve a rapid end to the violence and bloodshed in Syria, and a renewal of the 
 political process to search for common denominators in the inter-Syrian dialogue 
 about the future state order of the country. The identification of those, who are guilty 
 of crimes requires an objective and unprejudiced approach and is anticipated to 
 contribute to the promotion of a political settlement and national reconciliation. There 
 are no such items in the French project. On the contrary, it brings elements of 
 confrontation into the activity of the UN Security Council. 
 In the context of the UNSC deadlock, the Chairman of the Syrian Inquiry, Paulo 
Sérgio Pinheiro, announced that the panel would cooperate with state-level judiciaries by 
providing information it had on those suspected of committing war crimes in Syria 
(Cumming-Bruce, 2015). Further to this, one of the commissioners, Carla Del Ponte, publicly 
called for the establishment of a special ad hoc tribunal in the absence of progress on the 
issue of ICC referral. She suggested that this approach might serve to depoliticize the issue, 
allowing a broader range of perpetrators beyond the Syrian Government to be brought before 
an international court (Borger, 2015).  
Ongoing issues: Pointing the finger 
Allegations of the use of chlorine in Syria also motivated further investigations, this time 
established under the OPCW’s own Fact-Finding Mechanism (FFM). The mandate of the 
FFM extended to confirming chemical weapon incidents, but not to attributing responsibility. 
These OPCW findings provided the bases of UNSC Resolution 2209 in March 2015, which 
condemned the use of chlorine gas and stated that the UNSC would take action against those 
who used such weapons under Article VII of the UN Charter. The Resolution demonstrated 
the possibility of consensus by the UNSC on chemical weapon issues, even overcoming an 
attempt by Iran to derail the process (Lynch, 2015). However, tensions within the UNSC in 
relation to the issue of accountability were still evident in an exchange which took place at 
thus meeting. The United States and France claimed that the recent OPCW FFM reports 
provided clear evidence that the Syrian government had used chlorine. The UK also noted the 
need to refer the Syrian case to the ICC (United Nations Press Office, 2015a).  In response, 
Russia challenged this interpretation, arguing that the UNSC could adopt either a professional 
and expert approach or a media-based approach and rush to blame the Syrian government 
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while shielding those who might have been really responsible (United Nations Press Office, 
2015a).  
In this context, both Russia and China asserted the primacy of the OPCW in 
determining violations of the chemical weapons ban which could lead to action under Article 
VII of the UN Charter (United Nations Press Office, 2015a). However, there was no 
capability within the OPCW to confirm culpability. This situation, as well as further evidence 
of ongoing chemical weapon use in Syria, provided the basis of a further UNSC Resolution 
(2235 [2015]), which established a joint UN-OPCW investigatory mechanism (JIM) into 
culpability. The mechanism was initially established with a mandate of one year. It would 
attempt to attribute those incidents occurring in Syria which were confirmed by the FFM 
(Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the 
United Nations Joint Investigate Mechanism, 2016a, p. 10). After this resolution was passed, 
U.S. permanent representative Samantha Power was quoted as stating that “Pointing the 
finger matters” (United Nations Press Office 2015b) and would help to prevent future attacks, 
adding that such a mechanism would help to gather information and to name those 
responsible. The Russian permanent representative was more cautious, however, noting that 
the efforts of the mechanism should not add to the further antagonism of the parties to the 
conflict. He also emphasized the need to address the challenge posed by terrorist use in the 
Middle-East region (United Nations Press Office 2015b).  
JIM attribution and subsequent developments 
The JIM Leadership Panel has produced several reports. Its first two reports focused 
primarily on delineating the scope and methodologies and other practical aspects of the 
investigation (Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
and the United Nations Joint Investigate Mechanism, 2016c, p. 5). The JIM panel chose nine 
cases to initially investigate out of 23 which had already been confirmed with utmost 
confidence by the FFM (Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons and the United Nations Joint Investigate Mechanism, 2016a, p. 3). The 
JIM Leadership Panel’s third report, which was the first to present substantive findings, was 
published in August 2016. In that report the Panel concluded that it had sufficient evidence to 
implicate the Islamic State as well as the Syrian Arab Air Force in specific chemical weapon 
attacks (Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and 
the United Nations Joint Investigate Mechanism, 2016b). The fourth report was published in 
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October 2016 and identified specific units in the Syrian Air Force (Leadership Panel of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations Joint 
Investigate Mechanism, 2016c). These findings re-ignited calls for an ICC referral in addition 
to chemical weapon specific sanctions against the regime from the US and other Western 
states (See e.g., Irish, 2016). On the other hand, Russia questioned the legitimacy of the JIM 
process. Russian officials argued publicly that the process focused disproportionately on 
allegations against the regime, was methodologically flawed, and had been instrumentalized 
by Western states (Churkin, 2016a, 2016b). In the context of an increasingly fractious OPCW 
Executive Council, the findings of the third and fourth reports were adopted through vote 
rather than consensus (the latter had been the historic norm in this forum) (for commentary, 
Hart, 2017). At this stage, the FFM process, the Syrian Commission of Inquiry, and civil 
society groups continued to gather and share evidence of chemical weapon use in Syria.  
The JIM process also continued to attempt to attribute attacks confirmed by the FFM. 
The mandate for this mechanism was time limited, and following a long negotiation process, 
and would eventually be extended for a further year by UNSC Resolution 2319 in November 
2016. However, in the context of increasingly vocal criticism of the work of the JIM by 
Russia following the third and fourth JIM reports, it was already clear that existing or future 
JIM findings were unlikely to lead to UNSC action. Upon the adoption of the November 
2016 Resolution the Russian representative repeated concerns about the politicization of the 
JIM process and called upon the JIM Leadership Panel “not to bend to what we [Russia] 
expect will vast amounts of pressure from states, who are guided purely by their own geo-
political interests in the Middle-East.’” Further to this Russia noted that it intended “to 
continue flagging up as far a possible the technical, logistical, legal and procedural aspects of 
the mechanism’s activities” (Safronkov, 2016). 
 The following month, the UN General Assembly also took the unprecedented step of 
establishing a new investigative mechanism (IIIM) (A/RES/71/248). This move was resisted 
by Russia and China which argued that such mechanism could only be established through 
the UNSC vote, or at the request of the member state in question. Despite these reservations, 
the new initiative was established to serve to collect, consolidate, preserve, and analyze 
evidence as well as to prepare files to facilitate and expedite criminal proceedings in national, 
regional or international courts (See e.g., Whiting, 2017; Elliott, 2017). 
Meanwhile, the tide of the Syrian war was changing. This was reflected in the 
breaking of the Aleppo siege by Syrian and Russian forces in October 2016. The following 
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month, the surprise U.S. election result essentially killed the prospect of further substantial 
U.S. support to anti-Assad forces. At this point then, it was clear that strategic calculations in 
Washington, DC were changing. In particular, the announcement by U.S. officials in March 
that the United States was shifting its focus from regime change to the fight against Islamic 
State (Nichols, 2017) as well as the general skepticism of the U.S. president Donald Trump of 
international institutions (Fisher, 2017) suggested a potential shift in how the United States 
would engage with the chemical weapon justice issue in international forums. In reality, there 
has been significant continuation of U.S. policies on the issue during the first year of the 
presidency. 
The first major action of the Trump presidency was to submit a draft UNSC resolution 
with the UK and France (S/2017/172). This resolution would have seen the Council take note 
of the recent JIM findings. The draft resolution also proposed sanctions against a specified 
list of individuals involved in chemical warfare (as identified by the JIM) as well as controls 
on chemical weapon related materials (including chlorine). The draft also called for the 
establishment of a Committee to designate other individuals, groups, and entities to be 
subjected to the proposed measures, as well as a panel of experts to gather and analyze 
information on the implementation of the measures. These sanctions would be in-line with 
those that that the United States, the EU, and other Western states had in place and continued 
to develop and implement in relation to chemical weapon use by the Syrian Government. The 
motion was vetoed by Russia and China,  with the Russian President quoted as saying that the 
sanctions would be “totally inappropriate” and “... would only hurt or undermine confidence” 
in peace talks (as cited in “Syria War,” 2017). Toward the end of March, Russia and China 
circulated a draft UNSC Resolution which called for the extension of the JIM process to 
cover allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the Islamic State in Iraq, which was 
dismissed as unnecessary by the UK permanent representative (“Russia, China Suggest for 
UNSC,” 2017). 
By March of 2017, while fresh allegations of small-scale chemical weapon use and 
international level investigations continued, it was clear that the use of chemical weapons, 
problems with the Syrian OPCW declarations, as well as international responses to apparent 
violations had to a great extent become a routinized aspect of the international politics of the 
Syrian conflict. It also appeared unlikely that Russia or P-3 states would make concessions in 
in their own official narratives on who had and was continuing to use chemical weapons in 
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Syria. However, the FFM, JIM, the IICISAR and IIIM, continued to generate and collate 
evidence of war crimes. 
Conclusion  
There has been a general recognition of the need for accountability on the issue of chemical 
weapons, but this has not led to a transcendence of broader political commitments and 
strategy. Great powers committed as early as 2013 to differing accounts of who was, or was 
likely to, employ chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War. In August 2013, it appeared for 
a while at least as if chemical weapons might also become a means for the United States to 
shift its strategy in Syria. However, chemical weapons have actually been of limited 
significance in the second part of the Syrian Civil War (in both physical terms and in terms of 
grand strategy and diplomacy). Indeed, persistent and credible accusations of ongoing 
violations by the regime have been of limited direct consequence for the broader war-effort 
the regime and its main ally Russia (which is already heavily sanctioned by the West). 
Indeed, the limited nature of the strikes ordered by President Trump in the wake of the Khan 
Shaykhun attacks in April 2017 has actually served to reassert this.  
Some of the major fault lines on this issue are traceable to ideas expressed within the 
2012 Geneva Communique, the product of early multilateral peace negotiations (see 
Lundgren, 2016). This document contained within its commitment an inclusive and wide 
ranging conception of transitional justice. It outlined the need for “Accountability for acts 
committed during the present conflict must be addressed. There also needs to be a 
comprehensive package for transitional justice, including compensation or rehabilitation for 
victims of the present conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.” It is 
clear, however, that states have prioritized these aspects in different ways in their policies on 
Syria. Importantly these differences go beyond immediate considerations in the Syrian Civil 
War, reflecting much more fundamental tensions in the international system between great 
powers.  
 These differences have, of course, been observable in the UNSC with the issue of ICC 
referral central to this debate. These tensions would also be apparent in the Russian and 
Chinese resistance to the IIIM in the UN General Assembly. In addition, disagreements on 
this matter can also be traced through developments in the context of the OPCW, and in 
relation to the JIM. While the United States and allies have treated the FFM and JIM in 
particular as a via media to punitive international justice, both Russia and China have tended 
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to favor insulating progress in this forum from the UNSC and the damaging effects of 
allegations on their own visions of Syrian peace. It is clear, that the fallout we saw in 
response the FFM and JIM reports on the Khan Shaykhun attacks of April 2017 were 
foregrounded by Russian and Chinese reservations about the political function that JIM report 
findings might play.    
 Evidence generated in the context these various investigatory processes may be of 
relevance to future trials–in Syria, an ad hoc international court, or elsewhere. And indeed, 
prosecutions of perpetrators of other war crimes committed in Syria have already begun at 
national level in German courts. However, it is clear that trade-offs in international, regional, 
and domestic politics over coming years may offer immunity to many of those accused. With 
this in mind, it is clear that there is a continued need for states not only to support and protect 
existing process against the type of accusations which have dogged the JIM, but also support 
independent evidence-gathering and analysis work within broader civil society. This is to 
help ensure the collation and preservation of evidence (including importantly digital 
evidence) which may be of use at a future point at which political conditions are more 
amenable to accountability. This includes attacks which occurred before Syrian membership 
to the CWC, which have not been investigated under either the FFM or JIM mechanism. This 
includes notably the major attack which took place on the outskirts of Damascus on August, 
21, 2013.  
 Speaking in relation to the future of international justice more generally, it is apparent 
that the Syrian conflict has become emblematic of deeper transformations in the global 
system. We have shown that in relation to justice in fragile states in particular, that the 
resurgence in pragmatism needs to be taken seriously. This then requires not only the 
recalibration of our understanding of international level politics in a more strategic sense- but 
also the role of justice narratives in this changing context.  
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